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Abstract
The present essay examines the common approach in reading the relationship 
between Muslims and Russian society as if  they were bound by perpetual 
conflict. Following this angle, historians argue that the Russians underwent 
long term conflict with Muslims and claim that the Russians have suffered 
more than any other people in facing the hostile world of  Islam. Some also 
argue that Muslims were completely subdued by the Russians due to Islam’s 
incompatibility with the secular and atheist Soviet regime. A careful survey 
of  literature on the history of  Muslims in Russia, however, does not always 
lead to the conclusion that the two sides were in continuous conflict. In fact, 
aside from conflict and subjugation, both Russians and the Muslims enjoyed a 
considerable level of  peace and shared a similar attitude of  flexibility in mutual 
cooperation. Given the extent of  flexibility of  Muslims in their encounter 
with the Russians throughout the Czar and the Soviet regimes, I argue that 
contemporary scholars have scaled down the dynamic of  both Russian and 
Muslims intellectual articulations in relation to modern politics as well as to the 
internal relationship between the two sides, and that the relationship between 
them can be written as other than perpetual conflict. 
[Artikel ini mengulas hubungan Islam dan Rusia yang kerap dijelaskan 
dalam konteks relasi saling bertentangan. Dari cara pandang demikian, ahli 
sejarah kerap berpendapat bahwa konflik antara keduanya sudah terjadi lama 
dan orang Rusia adalah korban paling parah yang diakibatkan kebrutalan 
Islam. Semantara itu, ahli sejarah lainnya berpendapat bahwa orang Islam 
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sepenuhnya terjajah oleh kekuasaan Rusia karena Islam tidak cocok dengan 
sistem sekuler dan ateis Soviet. Jika dibaca literatur mengenai sejarah Islam 
di Rusia, maka relasi konfliktual antara keduanya tidak sepenuhnya benar. 
Faktanya, terlepas dari konflik dan penaklukan, baik orang Rusia dan 
umat Islam dapat hidup secara damai dan fleksibel dalam kehidupan sosial 
mereka. Dengan menjelaskan fleksibelitas relasi antara Muslim dan Rusia 
pada masa kerajaan Rusia dan rejim Soviet, penulis berargumen bahwa 
kebanyakan ilmuwan kontemporer menyederhanakan relasi Islam dan 
Rusia dalam konteks politik modern serta relasi internal antara keduanya, 
karenanya relasi Islam dan Rusia perlu dijelaskan secara seimbang bahwa 
relasi konflik antara Islam dan Rusia tidak sepenuhnya benar.]
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A. Introduction
One major emplotment in the historical writing of  Islam in 
Russian history is ‘tragedy,’ that is, one that sees conflict as the dominant 
pattern that shaped the relationship between Muslims and the Russians.1 
Contemporary historians are inclined to take this view for granted and 
assumed that the relation between Muslims and Russians is bound by 
permanent conflict, similar to that of  Muslims and Christendom in the 
Byzantine Empire, or in Spain and Southern Europe. Following this angle, 
the Russians are often praised for their great endeavors to overcome the 
barbaric Muslims, who for centuries have threatened the rest of  Europe. 
A closer look at the present studies indicates that this particular point 
of  view has become a typical pattern in nearly all Russian and Soviet 
historical works.2 Russian historians, in this case tend to argue that the 
1  ‘Emplotmen’ is one of  the technical terms used by Hayden White in his 
categorization of  historical explanation, besides ‘argument’, and ‘ideological implication’. 
White further divides emplotment into four types; romance, satire, comedy, and tragedy. 
For a discussion of  White’s typology of  historical explanations, see Hayden White, 
Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1973), 5-7.
2 See for example, Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to 
the Soviet State (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 5.
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Russians underwent long term conflict with the Muslims and claim that 
they have suffered more than any other people in facing the hostile world 
of  Islam. This exclusive experience gives the Russians the privilege to 
write the history Muslims and Islam in Russia as a history of  conflict 
and that the Russians eventually subdued the Muslims.
Likewise, many of  contemporary non-Russian historians hold 
similar point of  view, that ‘the old prejudices and harmful customs’ –a 
Gorbachev’s favorite label for Islam-- and the Russians were in continuous 
conflict. In one of  his articles about Islam during the Soviet regime, for 
example, Yaacov Ro’i states in the opening paragraphs that “Islam, like 
other religions, fell victim to the militant atheism….the Soviet regime 
had no alternative but to suppress all its manifestations and institutions.”3 
In the same vein, Vernon Schubel, who studied Muslims in Uzbekistan’s 
context, states that “no other aspect of  Uzbekistan’s past was so maligned 
under the Soviet system as Islam…, Islam and Islamic institutions – 
including Sufism – were constantly blamed for the backwardness of  
the Uzbeks, which, in turn, justified their colonization by the Russians 
and Soviets.”4 Muslims, as Ro’i and Schubel observe, were completely 
subdued by the Russians because of  its incompatibility with the secular 
and atheist Soviet regime.
A careful survey of  literature on the history of  Muslims in Russia, 
however, does not always lead us to the conclusion that the two sides 
were in continuous conflict. It is true that in the long interaction between 
Russians and Muslims, wars, genocides, persecutions, and anti-religious 
propaganda were inseparable from the reality of  the both sides. However, 
as I shall show in this article, the relationship between the Russians and 
the Muslims is also demonstrated by pragmatic cooperation on the both 
sides. That is to say, aside from conflict and subjugation, both the Russians 
and the Muslims enjoyed a considerable level of  peace and shared a 
similar attitude of  flexibility in mutual cooperation. 
From the Muslims side, they did not always consider themselves 
3  Yaacov Ro’i, “The Secularization of  Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas,” in 
Yaacov Ro’i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 5.
4  Vernon Schubel, “Post-Soviet Hagiography and the Reconstruction of  the 
Naqshbandi Tradition in Contemporary Uzbekistan,” paper presented at the Conference 
of  Naqshbandis in Western and central Asia: Change and continuity, Swedish Reserach 
Institute Istambul June 9-11, 1997, p. 75.
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as being defeated and subjugated by the Russians. In fact, in certain 
periods, Muslims were ready to adopt Russian political ideology and 
placed their hope in the rulers, as was the case during the Czarist and the 
Communist regimes. Although there were massive anti-Islamic and anti-
religious campaigns during the reigns of  the Czar and the Soviet regimes, 
Muslims in Russia were not completely subjugated. On the contrary, it 
was during these periods of  hostility that Muslims creatively adapted their 
belief  to meet the challenge of  the new realities they faced. This degree 
of  adaptation may be unprecedented in the overall Islamic history. One 
must remember that in the normative sense, Islam does not separate the 
realm of  religion from the realm of  politics. However, Islam also does 
not formulate a definite pattern of  political theory. It is left to Muslims 
to decide what constitutes the ideal pattern of  a political system. In this 
sense, they may follow a specific interpretation of  traditional Islamic 
political tradition, which leads to the establishment of  Islamic state, or 
develop a new legal interpretation (ijtihād) to cooperate with existing 
regimes. In the long history of  Muslims in Russia, Muslim leaders often 
made the pragmatic decision to cooperate with the regime, regardless 
whether the regime was Muslim or infidel (kāfir). 
Given the extent of  flexibility of  Muslims in their encounter with 
the Russians throughout the Czar and the Soviet regimes, I intend to 
offer a different emplotment other than ‘tragedy’ or emphasizing on 
conflict on both sides in writing about Islam and Muslims in Russian 
history. The latter will not only lead us to a narrow conclusion about the 
relationship between Islam and Russia, but also unjustifiably scale down 
the dynamic of  both Russian and Muslims intellectual articulations in 
relation to modern politics as well as to the internal relationship between 
the two sides.
In the following paragraphs, I shall contour the history of  Muslims 
in Russia from the period of  the early nineteenth century to the dawn 
of  the Soviet regime and analyze not only conflict and its ideological 
implication, but also adaptation and cooperation of  Muslims within 
different Russian political systems. The goal is modest; by doing so, I 
intend to offer an alternative way of  reading the relationship between 
Muslims and Russians. 
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B. Frame and Historical Background
The first formal encounter between Russia and Islam is known to 
have started since the eighth century following the Arab–Khazar war. At 
the time of  the war, Russia did not exist as the nation known today. The 
Russians at the time, or the proto-Russians to be more precise, constituted 
several eastern Slavic tribes such as Kiev, Chernigov, Pereslavl’, Polotsk, 
Rostov, Liubech, Novgorod, Izborsk, and Kasogi, whose daily life 
mostly depended on agriculture. It took several centuries for the proto-
Russians to seek political consolidation and establish themselves as ‘Rus’. 
One modern historian, Galina M. Yemelianova, suggests that it was 
the dynamic relationship between the Khazar, Biarmia and Varangian, 
mostly drawn by long term conflict, that gave the consciousness for 
‘Rus’ to emerge. Quoting Arab sources, Yemelianova also informs us 
that during the Arab-Khazar war, some proto-Russian tribes, who were 
under domination of  the Khazars, supported the Khazars and helped 
them to build their defenses in the Northern Caucasus. This support 
continued when the Khazars devastated the Arabs at Talas in 751 C.E. 
and expanded their rule over the Southern part of  the North Caucasus. 
Furthermore, the Khazars domination over the proto Russians remained 
continuous until the invasion of  the Scandinavian Varangian tribe who 
sought economic control in the south, which in turn was central to the 
emergence of  Rus’ consciousness. One of  the most noticeable events 
following the conquest of  the Varangian was the establishment of  Kiev 
as the new political capital of  the Kievan Rus. Accordingly, although the 
Varangian were foreign to the region, they absorbed the basic indigenous 
economic and socio-political traditions, as well as the local rituals and 
etiquette. Hence, what we know today as Rus is basically an amalgamation 
of  the proto-Russian tribes which fell under the tutelage of  the many 
political rulers such as the Khazars and the Varangians.5 
Further encounters between the Kievan Rus and Islam, however, 
5  For further discussion of  the role of  the Khazar, Biarmia, and Varangian in 
the formation of  Russians, see Galina M. Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical 
Survey (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 1-7. 
Note that that the name ‘Rus’ is still problematic in its etymological terminology. Some 
Russian historians argue that the name was a self-name of  the Varangian military and 
civil aristocracy; others argue that the name derived from one of  the Eastern Slavic 
tribes who lived along the bank of  river ‘Rus.’ See Notes 10, Ibid., p. 205.
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did not lead to the same idea of  amalgamation as had occurred between 
the Khazars and Varangians. When the shah of  Khwarazm was preparing 
to build a faith-based relationship with the Kievan princes in the tenth 
century, for example, Vladimir of  Kiev solemnly rejected the Muslim 
missionaries and insisted that “the Rus love to drink, we cannot be without 
this” [Islamic Law forbids drinking alcohol].6 The same Vladimir of  Kiev 
was also known to have said that undergoing circumcision and neither 
eating pork nor drinking wine were unpleasant to him.7 This leads some 
historians to believe that the idea of  amalgamation was only significant 
during the formative period of  Russian identity and that the relationship 
between Russia and Islam after the tenth century to the nineteenth century 
onward was colored by tensions to the extent that being a Russian and 
a Muslim are incompatible. 
However, to assume that religion was the sole primary issue 
between Russians and the surrounding Muslims is erroneous. As the 
matter of  fact, both Muslims and Russian rulers at the time never sent 
armies for the sake of  religious domination. It is true that when the 
Russians adopted Orthodox Christianity, their political attitude toward 
the neighboring Muslims changed dramatically. One may note that after 
the fall of  Constantinople, the center of  the Eastern Church, in 1453 to 
the Ottomans, the court clergy as well as the princes of  Moscow began 
to proclaim that the Russian people and its rulers were the sole divinely 
ordained guardians of  Christianity and Moscow was the only centre of  
Christianity.8 Similarly, from the Muslim side, Russia was seen as the 
enemy of  the faith and therefore it was necessary to build a defense 
against them. A letter of  Abdullah Khan of  Bukhara in 1572 to his 
protégé Kuchum Khan of  Siberia captures Muslims’ fear of  Russian 
domination in Siberia: 
6  Cited in Andreas Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of  the Russian 
Empire,” in Edward Allworth (ed.) Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on 
Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 141. 
7 See, Edward Allworth, “Encounter,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Central Asia: 130 
Years of  Russian Dominance, a Historical Overview (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1994), p. 2.
8  Hans Bräker, “Soviet Policy toward Islam,” in Edward Allworth (ed.), Muslim 
Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspective on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 163. 
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The enemies of  our faith at the present time are the kāfir [Russians] 
….you must conclude peace [with local Asian chieftains] and think 
about taking your lands out of  the kāfir’s hand again. If  you carry on the 
present practices without coming to an understanding….you will remain 
powerless before the kāfirs.9
This letter basically shares the same negative opinion about 
Russians as the latter had about Muslims. However, further information 
on the same Muslim khanates does not reflect enmity for all Russians. It 
was true that Russians eventually captured Siberia and forced the Muslims 
in the region to be their vassals, but one cannot deny that the relationship 
between Muslims in Bukhara and the Russian empire remained peaceful 
for centuries. 
One may look at a particular event that reflects certain degree 
peaceful relationship between Muslims and Russians. When the Golden 
Horde became weak around the fifteen century due to civil wars among 
the khanates, the Russian princesses, who were relatively stronger than the 
rest of  the khanates, began to take the lands of  the Golden Horde and 
unify them as Russian vassals. This process was possible not only because 
the Russians were militarily superior, but also because the khanates were 
voluntarily willing to join the Russian leadership. Such was the case when 
the Khanate of  Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia, and the Crimea as well as 
from the Nogai Hordes joined the Russian princes. The Russian princes 
indeed welcomed them, and in return for their voluntarily service in 
Russian cavalry, the warriors of  these khanates were given properties. 
The Moscow princes also gave the elites of  the khanates honorable 
positions and respected them as members of  the nobility of  Moscow. 
The barrier of  faith, of  course, remained between them. However, the 
difference in faith did not prevent the Russians and the Muslim khanates 
from building both military and political alliance.10
One may note that in the middle of  the sixteenth century, the 
Tatars, who were under control of  Russian princes, initiated a series of  
revolts. The Russians in return responded with force and harsh policies. 
Many Muslims were slain, others were forcibly baptized or otherwise 
exiled to other places. However, the Russians under Ivan the Terrible 
9  Cited in Allworth, “Encounter,” p. 3.
10 Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of  the Russian Empire,” p. 142.
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were not interested in sustaining conflict with Muslims. Ivan believed 
that his flexible policy toward the Muslims would secure his reign and 
that maximizing economic resources was better than repression. Ivan 
was more interested in building cooperation with the loyal Muslim upper 
class, than dealing with the insurgents. Ivan guaranteed the land of  the 
Muslims and gave them privileges to function in the local administration 
and, also, integrated them into the upper stratum of  his regime. During 
this period, tens of  thousands of  Russian peasants became laborers and 
lived as dependants on Muslims lands with the approval of  Ivan. The 
fact that the Orthodox peasants worked for Muslim landowners may 
have been unthinkable elsewhere in Europe during the same period.11
This pragmatic policy might be considered too liberal as it gives 
a degree of  tolerance to Muslims. However, there were cases in which 
the Orthodox religious officials plead for an active policy of  missionary 
activity among the Muslims. Some representatives of  the Orthodox 
officials, with their considerable political influence, were known to have 
insisted that there must be an aggressive policy to use force and compel 
Muslims to be baptized, including the destruction of  mosques. The 
Russian authorities, however, remained aloof  of  the Orthodox official 
demands and continued to guarantee Muslims freedom from forced 
conversion. In the instructions of  the czar to the newly appointed 
archbishop Gurii in 1555, the missionaries were warned to avoid coercive 
activity as formulated in the following statements: “He shall baptize 
those Tatars who seek baptism voluntarily, but without the use of  force.” 
Eight years later, the Moscow authorities reemphasized their message 
that, “There are people who say, ‘Belief  is the enemy of  (other) beliefs. 
Therefore Christian rulers annihilate the Muslim.’ But it is written for us 
in the Christian scriptures that it is never permissible to convert anyone 
to our faith by force. For whoever will hold a belief, he should believe 
in that belief. God will judge in the Hereafter who has the true belief  
and who has the false. Human beings have no say on this. Among us, 
in our land, many people of  the Muslim religion serve us, and they live 
11  Ibid., pp. 143-44. Bennigsen and Broxup, however, downplayed this kind of  
pragmatic relationship as for personal reasons rather than for ideological reasons. See 
Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 77.
Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2013 M/1435 H 319
The Adaptation and Cooperation of  Minority Muslims in Russian History
according to their belief.”12 
In the seventeenth century, one may also find that Russian policy 
toward Muslims changed dramatically and was marked by a direct 
offensive against Muslim elites and Islamic values. Countless Muslim 
nobility were forced to be baptized or relinquish their lands to Orthodox 
peasants. In the same period, numerous mosques were also destroyed and 
Muslims became subject to the same poll tax as the peasants. However, 
as Kappeler has put it, forced conversion or Christianization in this 
period was only a camouflage for the ideology behind it: that is to achieve 
the new goals of  westernization and lift Russia to the higher level of  a 
regularized and unified state. 13 The idea of  systematizing society and to 
have a unified political system and law was also becoming the official 
policy of  the British in India as well as the Dutch in the Indonesian 
archipelago.14 In all these cases, the primary issue was the modernization 
of  society, not religion. Religion became an official concern only if  it 
was considered an obstacle to Moscow’s goal to become equal with the 
Western nations. 
It was natural that in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, 
pragmatic policies toward Muslims were revived because this policy 
had proven more beneficial in terms of  economic and political stability 
than conflict. Thus in the eighteenth century, Catherine II proclaimed 
tolerance toward the Muslims and created a Spiritual council responsible 
for Islam, which offered broad opportunities for religious development. 
It was the same Catherine who allowed Muslims to print religious books 
including the Quran after the enactment of  liberal legislation. By 1802, 
some 14,300 copies of  religious books were printed with the consent of  
the government. The publication of  religious books continued until the 
end of  the nineteenth century and the number of  books published by 
12  Quoted in Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of  the Russian 
Empire,” p. 144.
13  Ibid., pp. 145-46.
14  For a comprehensive discussion of  British policy in India, see for example 
Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of  Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). As for the Dutch in the Indonesian 
archipelago, see Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and 
Conflicts 1596-1950 (Amsterdam - Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993).
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Muslims exceeded one million.15 Similarly, by the end of  the nineteenth 
century, the Russian government also offered the same flexibility to the 
Jadid movements that sought to redefine Muslim identity by combining a 
European social organization with a Muslim religious and cultural basis.16
C. Adaptation and Cooperation during the Czarist Government
At the end of  the nineteenth century, history witnessed the advance 
of  European colonialism in almost all parts of  the Muslim world. If  
during the previous century, European colonial agents still focused on 
military and economic conquests, in the nineteenth century, they already 
moved ahead by developing a more sophisticated subjugation such as 
spreading European forms of  knowledge in education, applying law of  
procedures to Islamic court, and introducing political ideology in the 
form of  nationalism. Muslims in Russia and Central Asia were by no 
mean immune from the ideological currents that surrounded them. Like 
many other Muslims in different part of  the world, some Muslim figures 
in Russia were also in need of  preserving Islam and maintaining its purity, 
not by armed resistance, but by cooperating and adapting Islam to the 
realities of  the modern world.
The form of  cooperation and adaptation of  Islam to the realities 
of  Russian politics was multi faceted. Since the eighteenth century, 
the reinterpretation of  Islamic teaching to the modern reality became 
a serious project among Muslims in the Russian empire. However, 
the focus of  their movements were limited to internal affairs among 
Muslims, that is, to respond to the traditional view of  Islam, and not to 
offer ideological bargains to the Russians. One of  the most remarkable 
Muslim intellectuals who represented the idea of  the adaptation of  Islam 
15  Zenkovsky writes that during the period 1853-1859, Kazan University alone 
published 326,700 copies of  the Quran and other books in Tatar, and in the decade 
1854-1864 the number of  books published by the Tatars exceeded one million. See 
Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1960), p. 26.
16  The Jadid movement was born around the final years of  Czarist rule and 
focused on educational reform. Their opposition, the Qadim or the status quo, wished 
to retain an identity based on a traditional Islamic social and cultural base. For further 
discussion of  these movements, see, inter alia, Ahmet Kanlidere, Reform within Islam: 
The Tajdid and Jadid Movement among the Kazan Tatars (1809-1917): Conciliation or Conflict? 
(Istanbul: Eren, 1997). 
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to modern realities was Abu Nasr Qursavi (1783-1814), who was a teacher 
in a Bukharian madrasah. Qursavi was known for his idea of  breaking 
with the traditionalist view of  Islam, which dominated the spiritual life 
of  Russian Muslims. During his life, challenging the status quo of  the 
Russian ulama was seen as an act of  rebellion. Qursavi decided to flee to 
Istanbul after being condemned to death by the Emir of  Bukhara and 
accused of  impiety by the muftī of  Orenburg.17
After Qursavi, Russian Muslims also witnessed another Muslim 
intellectual who advocated a clear break with the old ulama, that was 
personalized in the activity of  Shihab al-Din Marjani (1818-1889). Marjani 
fought all his life to rid Islam of  the dogmatism of  traditional theology 
and to prove that Islam could be, as it was in the past, perfectly compatible 
with progress and modern science. He denounced blind obedience to 
traditional authority (taqlīd), and advocated the right of  every believer to 
derive their own interpretation of  religion (ijtihād) based on the scripture. 
Moreover, he also urged Muslims to imitate of  the West while at the same 
time to preserve the integrity of  their Islamic faith.18
Ismail Bey Gasprinsky (1851-1914), another key Muslim figure 
during the Czarist government, also voiced a form of  cooperation that 
offers concrete ideological bargaining with Russian empire. He received 
his higher education in Bakhchisarai and Moscow and was exposed to 
political atmospheres of  Paris and Istanbul, which eventually lead him to 
the ideological current and intellectual trends among his contemporaries. 
Two most important ideological currents that influenced his movement 
were the Young Ottoman and Pan-Islamic movement. The former 
was initiated by Kemal Pasha, Shinasi Efendi, and Zia Pasha, which 
aimed to Turkey’s revolutionary cultural and literary Europeanization, 
whereas the latter was a product of  the Muslim thinker and reformer 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). Jamal al-Din and his Pan-Islamic 
movement were known for their campaign of  purifying Muslim religious 
practices from superstition and vulgar popular beliefs, as well as raising 
the Muslim’s intellectual and educational standards. They also aimed at 
liberating Muslims from Christian European colonialism and unifying 
17  Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 70. 
18  Ibid.
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Muslims into one federation of  states.19 However, unlike Al-Afghani and 
Pan-Islamic movement, Gasprinsky refused to accept the idea of  the 
radicalism of  the Muslim world against the encouraging West such as in 
Russia. Likewise, he also condemned the so-called ‘Westernisers,’ that 
is those who considered that the salvation of  Islam lay in the imitation 
of  European civilization, for their uncritical and submissive attitude.20
One of  Gasprinsky’s major contributions to the Muslim masses was 
his idea of  unity, that is, unity of  language, mind, and action. Gasprinsky 
was aware of  the potential strength of  the unity of  Muslims in the form 
of  pan-Turkism. He was convinced that the decline of  Muslims was 
only temporary and that the future of  humanity belonged to the Turkic 
Islam. Therefore, he urged Russian Turks to unite on the basis of  their 
similar culture and religion. However, he was very careful in his attitude 
toward the Ottoman and the Russian state to avoid political backlash. 
In this regard, he promoted continual existence of  both the Russian and 
Ottoman. He wrote, in his pamphlet published in 1896, “Muslims and 
Russians can plow, sow, raise cattle, trade, and make their livings together 
or side by side.”21 Gasprinsky also regarded that Russians and Muslims are 
bound by fate to work together. In one of  his famous article published 
in 1905, he wrote, “Russians and Turk are bound together in a huge 
common plain extending from the foothill of  the Altais and Pamirs to 
the swamps of  the Baltic sea…Such it was in the past, and in the future 
these people will understand that they must walk hand in hand in order 
to find the way of  life they both need.”22 
Gasprinsky also insisted that the most preferable partner for 
Muslims were Russian. Of  all European nations, Russia was the closest 
to Islam. In fact, Russia and Muslims had maintained eight centuries 
long relationship which had resulted mutual understanding between the 
two.23 More than merely a partnership of  living together in Russian land, 
Gasprinsky even moved further to build partnership on equal terms 
for the conquest of  the world and fight against British domination. 
In one of  his pamphlets he said: “Let us imagine that Russia entered 
19  Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 31. 
20  Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 78-79.
21  Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, pp. 31-33.
22 Ibid.
23  Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 79.
Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2013 M/1435 H 323
The Adaptation and Cooperation of  Minority Muslims in Russian History
into friendly relations with Turkey and Persia…Russia would become 
kindred to the entire Muslim East and would certainly stand at the head 
of  Muslim nations and their civilization, which England is attempting 
so persistently to do.”24
Gasprinsky offered the full support of  the Muslims to Russians 
for a hope that Muslims would have total religious and cultural freedom 
and absolute equality with the rest of  Russians. Thus, Gasprinsky’s idea 
of  cooperation meant to establish the mutual benefits of  Russians and 
Muslims. From the Muslim side, the benefit meant equality and the 
preservation of  the Islamic faith and Turkic identity as Russian Muslims. 
Later, we find that Gasprinsky failed to materialize his idea of  Turkic 
unity not only because the Czarist government was unable to respond 
to his appeal, but also because of  the complexity and the diversity of  
Russian Muslims, even though the majority of  them were the Turkic-
speaking peoples.25
Yusuf  Akchura Oğlu (1876-1933), a Tatar intellectual, voiced similar 
idea as that of  Gasprinky’s. He proposed a Muslim partnership with the 
Russians by joining to one Russian liberal party; the ‘Constitutional 
Democrat.’ A brief  bio-bibliographical record of  Akchura Oğlu shows 
that he was from a rich family of  industrialists in Simbirsk, and graduated 
from Istanbul and French universities. He entered his first political 
career as one of  the founders of  the great Muslim political party, Ittifaq 
al-Muslimin. After joining the ‘Constitutional Democrat’ and becoming 
the member of  its Central Committee in 1905, he tried to make use 
of  the party’s prestige and influence at the Duma. His purpose was to 
voice the Muslim demands for cooperation and through legal action 
at the constitutional level. Although he was finally elected a Deputy at 
the first Duma, his dream of  Russian-Muslim partnership was proven 
a utopia when all the Russian liberals of  the ‘Constitutional Democrat’ 
did not agree with a single demand presented by him and other Muslim 
delegates at the Duma. Like the Czarist government, the Russian liberals 
failed to deal with their Muslim fellow citizens, let alone to hold their 
24  Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, p. 34.
25  Hiro notes that Gasprinsky’s idea of  promoting the unity of  Turkic speaking 
people failed because the reality of  the various Turkic dialects had matured as languages 
in their own right. See Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of  
Central Asia (London: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 5.
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national aspiration.26
Even after the failure of  Gasprinsky and Akchura Oğlu, Muslims in 
Russia still witnessed another effort to build a Russian-Muslim partnership 
in the monarchy systems. In spring 1906, another movement, which is 
called the Tangchylar (‘Those of  the Morning Star’), was founded to 
voice similar aspirations in the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries political 
program. This movement, however, did not survive.27 
All these movements, from Qursavi, down to Gasprinsky, Akchura 
Oğlu and the Tangchylar movements show the desperate attempts of  
Muslims to adapt Islam and to build real political cooperation with 
the Russians. Despite of  the internal divergence among Muslims, and 
that many these movements failed, the desire to build an ideological 
cooperation with the Russians indicates a critical juncture at which 
Muslims started to exercise political ijtihād which was unprecedented in 
their history. The nineteenth century Muslims of  Russia imagined that 
their relationship with the Russians does not mean subjugation by the 
Russian side, but a cooperation that may complement the Russian idea 
of  modernization, while at the same time preserving their Islamic faith.
D. Adaptation and Cooperation during the Early Soviet Period
During the Soviet period, the official policy toward Muslims was 
relatively the same as under the previous regime. Islam as an institution 
became the subject of  political and ideological assault by the State and 
the Communist party. However, Islam was not the only religion that 
was persecuted. Buddhism, Judaism, Protestants and Catholics as well 
as the Orthodox met all the criteria for persecution by the Communist.28 
In the case of  Islam, the official policy makers of  Moscow and the 
Communist leaders considered this religion as the substantial factor that 
would influence the internal and external policies of  the regime. For this 
particular reason, the Soviet government continued a pragmatic policy 
toward Muslims. During the early period of  the Bolshevik revolution, 
the Communist leaders sought Muslim’s support and ignored the very 
26  Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 79-80.
27  Ibid., 80.
28  For discussion of  religion during the Bolsheviks, see Wladyslaw Kania, 
Bolshevism and Religion, trans. R. M. Dowdall (New York: Polish Library, 1946).
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fact that there would be an ideological conflict between communism and 
Islam, even though both Lenin and Stalin were aware of  the aspirations 
of  the Muslims toward pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism.
The Bolshevik leaders imagined a Russian people, a new community 
in which all people share single identity as Soviets and all contribute to 
the development of  the new community. Within the idea of  the Soviet 
man, Lenin, Stalin, and other Bolshevik leaders believed that Muslims 
too could be part of  the new community and to achieve the ideal goal 
together. They regarded Russia’s Muslims as potential allies of  the 
revolution, which claimed to defend the interests of  all economically 
dispossessed and socially deprived people. They portrayed the Czarist 
government as ‘a prison of  people’ and skillfully exploited the previous 
economic policy and therefore attracted Muslims by promising freedom 
from exploitation. In addition, they also promised national equality and 
the right to self-determination, and a fair redistribution of  land and wealth 
to all Muslims.29 For example, in one of  his public messages, Lenin was 
known to have said:
“All of  you whose mosques and prayer houses used to be destroyed, and 
whose beliefs and customs were trodden underfoot by the Tsars and 
oppressors of  Russian! From today, your beliefs, customs, your national 
and cultural institutions are free and inviolate. Organize your national 
life freely and without hindrance. You are entitled to this. Know that 
your rights, like the rights of  all peoples of  Russia, are protected by the 
whole might of  the Revolution and its agencies, the Soviets of  workers, 
soldiers’, and peasants’ deputies. Support, then, this Revolution and its 
sovereign Government…Comrades! Brothers! Let us march towards an 
honest and democratic peace. On our banners is inscribed the freedom 
of  all oppressed peoples.”30 
On other public occasions, Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders 
were also known to have said that there was no conflict between the 
Soviet system and Islam. They even spoke favorably about the Shari‘a 
and promised the preservation of  the Islamic courts in the certain 
regions of  Russia.31 Likewise, Muslim intellectuals and political leaders 
29  Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey, pp. 101-02.
30 Quoted in Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of  Central 
Asia, p. 11.
31  Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey, p. 103.
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put some hopes in the Bolshevik leaders and believed that they could 
contribute to the new reconstruction of  Russian society. This voluntary 
cooperation with the Bolshevik leaders should be understood as not only 
a mean to preserve faith, but also as an attempt to reconcile socialism 
and religion and to find a solution for the Muslim political problem. 
One of  the major factors that motivated Muslims to band with the party 
was their dissatisfaction the White Armies’ leaders whom they think 
incompetence and cannot accommodate the Muslim national aspirations. 
Stalin’s personal influence and Lenin’s promise to give Muslims the right 
of  secession added more affinity to the communist’s goal. Adding this 
fact together, Muslims pinned their hope to the October Revolution and 
were confident that it would be the first step towards their liberation.32 
One may also look how some prominent Muslims in Central Asia 
became the supporters of  the Bolshevik. The approach of  two particular 
Bolshevik leaders, V. Kuibyshev and M. Frunze was reported to be 
the major factor of  gaining Muslims’ support. These two Bolsheviks 
recognized local specific demands that were related to Islam, the local 
customary norms, and institution. Particularly, they emphasized the 
Bolsheviks’ positive attitude to the Shari‘a courts. As the result, not 
only Kuibyshev and Frunze won supporters among the liberal Muslims 
of  Central Asia, but also supporters among the radical. Therefore, in 
November 1917 in Tashkent, for example, the Muslim supporter of  the 
Bolshevik created the Soviet Government, the Sovnarkom (the Council 
of  People’s Commisars) of  Turkestan. Three years later, the Muslim of  
Turkestan even moved further to adapt Shari‘a to Soviet civil legal norms.33
From the point of  view of  the local Central Asian economic 
interests, one may also add that the Bolsheviks brought hope for 
reconstruction of  the economy that had been hampered by Czarist 
monopoly control over the cotton production industries. As Bacon 
pointed out, “economic development can be described as a general 
displacement of  certain local products by manufactured goods from 
Russia, which resulted in business failures and significant changes in the 
good and services provided by Central Asia merchants. Cotton which 
had been a crop raised for local consumption became under the Russian 
32  Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, p. 81.
33  Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey, p. 109.
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administration.”34 The Bolshevik revolution, in terms of  local Central 
Asian economic development was seen as the end of  Russian economic 
domination. 
Although the Bolsheviks were still in the process of  controlling all 
Russian territories, and they were not yet sure how they would implement 
Marxist theory among the non-Russian populations, Muslims believed 
that the new socialist order would accommodate their emancipation. 
Muslim leaders certainly knew that religion was not the interest of  
the Communists. If  there was a concern for religion, it was a concern 
addressed to the Orthodox Church’s extensive identification with the 
state, not to the Muslims of  Russia.35
Muslims who put hope in the Bolshevik also understood that 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin displayed little interest in assaulting popular 
religious belief. Their ideology suggested that religion, as part of  the 
superstructure, would be irrelevant as a consequence of  socio-economic 
transformation and dissemination of  knowledge. Persecution and 
repression, in this case, were futile. Lenin, for example, said in 1905 
that “religious humbugging of  mankind would cease with the end of  
economic slavery.” He also added that “it is necessary to take care to 
avoid hurting the religious sentiments of  believers, for this only serves 
to increase religious fanaticism.”36
In contrast to Lenin who avoided a direct contact with popular 
religious belief, the Muslims who supported the Bolsheviks took the 
opportunity to continue to voice their disagreement to the status quo 
of  the ulama. Their disagreements were not only visible in political 
movements, but were also found in Muslim literature written during the 
early period of  the Bolshevik. One of  best representative examples was 
from Abdulah Qadiriy, known as one of  Uzbek men of  letters flourished 
prior to the Bolshevik revolution. Qadiriy was critical of  the traditionalist 
ulama or the Qadim who were still holding religious authority. In one 
his major publications, Tinch Ish (Easy Work), he mocked the class of  
34  Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1966), pp. 105-115.
35  Bräker, “Soviet Policy toward Islam,” p. 163. 
36  Larry E. Holmes, “Fear No Evil: Schools and Religion in Soviet Russia, 
1917-1941,” in Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.) Religious Policy in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 126.
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mullahs and the wealthy who, in his view, have no appropriate knowledge 
to deal with modern problems. He, for example, wrote a parody about 
a mullah who spent two to three decades studying in madrasah and yet 
only knew about science and geography. The mullah deficiency in the 
latter is evident in the characterization of  America as a tribe of  the Franks 
who worked with lacquered leather and the English as the rulers of  the 
sea, simply because they built their cities on the ocean. So much for his 
intelligent, the mullah finally found a permanent position a prayer leader.37 
After the Bolshevik revolution, however, Lenin realized the possible 
danger of  Muslim political aspirations. The disagreement that previously 
existed among Muslims, between the Jadid and the Qadim, developed 
into Muslim political aspirations, which was slightly different than that 
of  the Communist leaders. To explain that this political aspiration was 
at odds with Lenin’s systematic Sovietization program in Central Asia as 
well as in the Caucacus and Transcaucacus, is to state what is obvious. 
Muslims were considered as threatening the stability of  the Soviet regime 
because of  their idea of  nationalism. The Bolshevik leaders argued that 
their proletarian revolution had destroyed Czarist imperialism in order 
to end exploitation by all national bourgeoisies. Therefore, they would 
never tolerate Muslim bourgeoisies who want to exploit Muslim workers 
and peasants.38
This then is the beginning in which the cooperation and self-
adaptation of  Islam grew into conflict with the Communist party. We may 
refer, for example, to Sadri Maksudi, who, on behalf  of  the Milli Mejlis 
(the National Council), which was created in July 1917 at the Second All-
Russian Muslim Congress, negotiated cooperation with the Bolsheviks. 
However, Maksudi arrived to a different conclusion than Lenin and Stalin, 
which was to create a separate Islamic communist party and to form a 
national-cultural autonomy for the Turko-Tatar Muslims of  the Volga 
Ural. As the result, the Bolsheviks banned Maksudi and his nationalism 
was considered a form of  bourgeois nationalism.39 
The case of  Sultan Galiev is also significant here. In the beginning 
37  Christopher Murphy, “Abdullah Qadiriy and the Bolsheviks: From Reform 
to Revolution,” in Jo-Ann Gross (ed.), Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of  Identity and 
Change (Durham and London: Duke University, 1992), pp. 190-195.
38  Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of  Central Asia, p. 11.
39  Yemelianova, Russia and Islam: A Historical Survey, pp. 100-101.
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Sultan Galiev believed that Bolshevism was the only solution to the dire 
socio-economic and national problems of  Russia. He and his comrades 
all agreed with the Bolshevik idea of  the Sovietization of  Muslims. 
However, unlike the Bolshevik’s goal, Sultan Galiev imagined the idea 
of  Sovietization as a full freedom from Russian domination and control, 
which the Communist’s leader were not prepare to accommodate. This 
different interpretation was considered unorthodox and therefore cannot 
be tolerated by the Communist leaders.40
After the first decade of  the Bolshevik revolution, all major 
Muslim political aspirations to join the Bolsheviks were banished by 
Stalin. However, the fact that Muslims tried build strategic alliances 
and cooperate with the Bolsheviks, with the main purpose to preserve 
Muslim interests such as the application of  Shari‘a beside the Soviet Civil 
law, proved that Muslims were not at all times against the communists. 
The aspiration of  Muslims to join the Bolsheviks must be seen as an 
original attempt to reconcile Islam with modern politics, in this case is 
the communist ideology. This attempt, in addition, was not merely a way 
to preserve the faith, but also a result of  a constructed imagination about 
the future of  Muslims in Russia. 
E. The Optimism of  the Official Islam 
After the period of  the Bolsheviks, we still witness another form of  
Muslim cooperation with the communist government, which may have 
been unprecedented in Muslim modern history. Unlike the adaptation 
during the early period the Bolshevik revolution, which was shaped by 
the liberal political aspirations of  Muslims to join the Bolsheviks, the 
adaptation of  Islam after the World War II was confined to the official 
policy directed by the communist government. Working behind the 
official policy of  the government, the so-called ‘Official Islam’ had a 
limited opportunity to articulate Islam and is therefore represented on 
more as subservience to the government.41 Nevertheless, their work with 
40  For discussion about Sultan Galiev, see Bennigsen and Broxup, The Islamic 
Threat to the Soviet State, pp. 82-85.
41  Ro’i considers Muslims position as subservient in a negative way and therefore 
implies that Muslims were subdued. He stated: “Although from time to time an imam-
khatib in one of  the functioning mosques would try to prevent the erosion of  religion in 
his community in defiance of  the authorities, registered clergy was largely subservient. 
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the government was no less than a creative attempt to adapt Islam and 
to guide Muslims into the reality of  living under the Communist system.
The nature of  the subservience of  the Official Muslims to the 
government cannot be separated from the previous events that resulted 
in an open conflict with the Communist leaders. We must note that since 
Bolshevik leaders could not confine the idea of  Islamic nationalism 
among Muslim leaders, they began to use force against Muslim leaders 
and Islamic institutions. Since 1920, the Bolshevik leaders started their 
destructive policy against Islamic institutions. Mosques, the Muslim 
clergy, and the Muslim’s property of  the waqf  were all the target of  direct 
control. In addition to that, Muslim activities in the fields of  education 
and jurisprudence were also terminated, as they were considered irrelevant 
to the Marxist-Leninist’s goal. Subsequently, atheistic propaganda was 
directed specifically to demonstrate the backwardness, harmfulness, 
and more significantly, the incompatibility of  Islam for goal of  the new 
socialist society.42
Muslims of  the official range considered their appointment 
to government offices as an opportunity to adapt Islam to the new 
atmosphere of  the Soviet regime. The fact that their appointment 
represented the mere pragmatic policy of  the communist regime did 
not affect their optimism to cooperate with the government. They held 
this position not only because they wanted to prevent the erosion of  
religion among Muslims, but also to continue to exercise Islamic values 
in a different political context.
One must note that the official appointment of  the Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate was organized at the time when the Soviet state had 
temporarily halted its persecution of  religion in an effort to enlist the 
support of  all its citizens, believers and non-believers alike, for the defense 
of  the motherland.43 Here, Muslim leaders appointed to the directorate 
The people who function in, and under the auspices of, the four spiritual directories that 
continue to operate until the end of  the Soviet period, were on the whole unquestioning 
lickspittles who accepted without reservation the constrain and limitation imposed by 
the regime. See, Ro’i, “The Secularization of  Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas,” p. 10.
42  Ibid., 9.
43  The Spiritual Directorate is divided geographically into four directorates, led by 
an executive committee presided over by a muftī, or in the case of  Shi‘ī in Baku, by Sheikh 
al-Islam; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of  Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 
Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2013 M/1435 H 331
The Adaptation and Cooperation of  Minority Muslims in Russian History
performed their functions extra-carefully so as not to directly oppose the 
Communist government. They also cautiously respond to the ongoing 
atheistic propaganda and demonstrate the compatibility of  Islam with 
science and modernity, and ultimately with the Communist ideology.44 
From the collection of  various sources, both official and non-
official documents, we are able to gain some information that describes 
the function of  the Spiritual Directorate and the content of  their fatwās. 
The function the Spiritual Directorate does not confine itself  to the 
defense of  traditional doctrine, but to explain the substance of  doctrine 
in a larger context. Thus, for example, when the mullah of  Osh was asked 
about the compatibility of  Islam and Communism, he stated: 
You, Marxists, simply do not understand the profoundly communist 
essence of  Islam. If  one reflects upon the teachings of  Muhammad, then 
it becomes clear that we, the Muslims, and Communism are marching 
elbow to elbow toward the fulfillment of  the ideals of  Muhammad.45
Similarly, the imam of  the Moscow mosque repeatedly states that 
“Islam gives the people the right to revolution,” which was explicitly an 
Islamic justification of  the Bolsheviks revolution. The mullah of  the 
Chistopol, N. Mofluikhanov, when he was asked whether he could see a 
conflict between the belief  in the existence of  God and an acceptance 
of  the discoveries of  science, said that “as one cannot see Reason, one 
cannot hold it, or prove that it exists, one cannot see the Almighty Allah; 
and the proof  of  the fact that He exists shall never be found.”46 
More than responding to general questions about the compatibility 
of  Islam and Communism, the members of  the Spiritual Directorate 
were also the firm supporters of  communist policy. Thus, for example in 
Tashkent; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of  European Russia and Siberia in 
Ufa; the Spiritual Directorate for the Muslims of  European Caucasus and Daghestan 
in Buynaksk, then in Makhach-Kala; the Spiritual Directorate for the Shi‘ite and Sunni 
Muslims of  Transcaucasia in Baku. For further discussion of  the spiritual directorate, 
see Alexandre Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay Chantal, “Islam in the Soviet 
Muslim Republics,” in Olivier Carré (ed.), Islam and the State in the World Today (New 
Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987), pp. 142-44.
44  Azade-Ayse Rorlich, “Islam under Communist Rule: Volga-Ural Muslims,” 
Central Asian Survey, Volume 1, 1 (1982), p. 29.
45  Ibid., p. 30.
46  Ibid.
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1948, they were reported to have issued fatwās to limit Muslims’ adherence 
to their rituals in order to prevent material damage that might occur to 
the economy. So they stated that Muslims must always go to work even 
during their religious festivals; fasting Ramadan is not obligatory for 
certain categories of  people; animal sacrifice and the payment of  the 
zakat was no longer compulsory as poverty became irrelevant under 
conditions of  socialism.47
The appropriation of  Islamic rituals to the Communist economic 
program, one may argue, can be considered a blasphemy to formal 
Islamic doctrine. Be that as it may, nowhere can we find evidence that 
the Spiritual directorate of  Muslims had equated the Islamic faith with 
communist ideology. That there were similarities between communism 
and the social concepts derived from Islamic teaching no longer needed 
further explanation. However, the mullah, khatib, and the imams, who 
were under the Spiritual Directorate still firmly considered that their faith 
was superior to atheism. Furthermore, it is also important to note that 
the mullah and imam still gained support from the community despite 
their innovation to cooperate with the Communists and being loyal to 
them. As such, they served more than just caretakers of  Islam during the 
Soviet period. With their ability to keep the integrity of  the faith while the 
maintaining the relationship with the Soviet power, they actually played a 
role in maintaining ideological balance between Islam and communism. 
F. Conclusion
From the foregoing paragraphs, we have noted that the history 
of  Muslims in Russia is not merely the history of  conflict, but also the 
history of  people who attempted to find balance between Islam and their 
Russian realities. Although for their most part, Muslims fell under the 
political control of  Russian governments, Muslims not always considered 
themselves as subjugated subjects or as a defeated community. The long 
experience of  Muslims living under the Czar, during the early period of  
the Bolshevik revolution, and after the Bolsheviks, represents more of  a 
long term dynamic of  Islamic intellectual articulation of  Russian politics, 
than an experience of  a defeated people. Muslims from all generations 
attempted to find the middle way in which they could preserve their faith 
47  Ro’i, “The Secularization of  Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas,” 10.
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and implement Islamic teachings for themselves and as a contribution to 
the Russian people at large. Although we have noted that there was not 
much that Muslims could do and offer to the Russian governments, their 
cooperation with regimes indicated that Islamic political aspirations did 
not always mean direct confrontation with the secular regime. 
What we have seen from Abu Nasr Qursavi (1783-1814), Shihab al-
Din Marjani (1818-1889), and Ismail Bey Gasprinky (1851-1914) in their 
effort to adapt Islam to their political context must be seen as a desperate 
attempt by Muslim intellectuals to deal with the dilemma of  holding the 
old doctrine in the modern reality. These Muslim leaders were in the same 
situation as other Muslims who lived in Turkey, British-India, Egypt and 
the Netherlands Indies. However, their interaction with the Czar and 
their various theological and socio-historical backgrounds shaped their 
ideology in a different way from the rest of  Muslims outside the Russian 
empire. At the end, their adaptation had a huge impact on other Muslims 
outside Russia who also put the same hope on the secularization of  the 
Communist system. The emergence of  the communist party in the newly 
born nation states of  the Muslim word at the dawn of  British and French 
colonialism was an outcome of  the experience of  the Russian Muslims 
with the Communist system. Whether the party survived or not, it would 
not change the fact that Muslims had shared the same optimism with 
all Russians.
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